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Abstract
This contribution draws upon the findings from a multi-year project in Iceland entitled Family Life and Disability. One goal
of the project was to analyse whether or not parents with intellectual disabilities (ID) experienced differential treatment
in custody deprivation proceedings. The dataset consisted of the analysis of publicly available court documents concern-
ing custody deprivation cases from 2012 to 2017. The project later expanded its dataset to include supplementary infor-
mation provided by parents. The initial findings mirrored that of the international literature, that parents with ID faced
disproportionate levels of permanent custody deprivation and prejudicial attitudes from the child protection system. This
contribution critically explores the evidence of parenting neglect that forms of basis for custody deprivation in our dataset.
Both authors noted a preponderance of evidence in our dataset that appeared strange and at times absurd, and generally
did not appear in cases were ID was not a factor. We contend that this evidence played a prejudicial role in the outcome of
these cases. In conclusion we argue that the patterned reliance upon this kind of ‘evidence’ is a form of structural violence
which serves to unjustly exclude marginalised groups from the parenting role.
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1. Introduction
This contribution focuses on one particular problematic
that emerged during the course of the project Family Life
and Disabilitywhich was conducted in Iceland from 2014
until 2017. This problem concerned how to analyse some
of the odd, strange or at times even absurd evidence of
parental neglect that routinely appeared in the analysis
of our data. The dataset for this project was a national
sample of publicly accessible court documents concern-
ing permanent custody deprivation cases over the years
2002 through to 2012. This was later extended up until
the time of writing and also included further supplemen-
tary information provided to us by some parents. Our
primary, but not exclusive, focus was on cases concern-
ing parents with intellectual disabilities (ID) who had lost
custody of their children as the result of actions under-
taken by the child protection system. We contend that
a careful analysis of the documents pertaining to child
protection cases can help to reveal some of the systemic
problems underlying how child protection is practiced.
The international literature is clear that parents with dis-
abilities, particularly ID, face disproportionate rates of
custody deprivation as the result of the entrenched stig-
mas and negative perceptions held against parents with
disabilities and which excludes them from the parenting
role. We contend that disability discrimination or preju-
dice against people with ID can shape crucial decisions in
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the child protection process and this is influential at ev-
ery stage of the child protection process, from notifica-
tions, to parenting assessments, to the implementation
and evaluation of support measures and in the final de-
cisions of the cases. In this article, our goal is to demon-
strate some of the effects of these biases through a close
examination of how some evidence of parental neglect
or incompetence is produced in these cases. The analyti-
cal framework that follows is intended as an exploration
of how we may interpret these findings, as well as to in-
vite debate.
In the data collection and assessment stages of our
project we remained perplexed as to why we found such
strange evidence of parenting neglect or incompetence
predominantly in cases concerning parents with ID, and
significantly less so in cases that concerned parents in
other situations, such as parents with substance abuse
issues. We noted an almost total absence of this kind of
evidence in cases that concerned the direct and severe
abuse or neglect of children for which there was clear
and uncontested evidence that children were in immedi-
ate danger or risk in terms of their health, safety or de-
velopment. It was not until the later stages of the project
that we started to realise the possible significance of this
finding. We will present some examples of this kind of
evidence which exemplifies the patterns that we have
noted before turning to a brief case study. The first au-
thor has been involved in research pertaining to parents
with ID in Iceland for many years. During the course of
our more recent project it became apparent, during a re-
analysis of some older data, that this kind of ‘absurd’ ev-
idence about the parenting capabilities of parents with
disabilities has been a feature of Icelandic child protec-
tion for many years. This contribution will conclude with
an analysis of a previously unpublished case study which
details the struggles by two parents with ID to retain cus-
tody of their newborn child. The details are presented
through data collected through interviews with all rele-
vant parties: the parents, some extended family of the
parents, the parents’ lawyer, the municipal social worker
assigned to the case, the prenatal care and maternity
ward professionals involved, child protection workers,
the disabled persons’ ombudsman tasked to safeguard
the parents’ rights, and the psychologist assigned to eval-
uate the parents. Informed by the insights drawn from
our Family Life and Disability project and the scholarly
literature, we will argue that biases, prejudiced assump-
tions and even fears about the parenting capabilities of
people with ID play a significant role in influencing the
child protection process, the nature of the evidence col-
lected and the results of unjust outcomes and unneces-
sary custody deprivation.
2. Parenting and ID
The international literature (e.g., Alexius & Hollander,
2014; Aunos, Goupil, & Feldman, 2003; Gould & Dodd,
2014; Lightfoot, Hill, & LaLiberte, 2010; Lightfoot, Lalib-
erte, & Cho, 2017; McConnell & Llewellyn, 2000; Mc-
Connell, Llewellyn, & Ferronato, 2006; Reinders, 2008),
as well as research in Iceland (Sigurjónsdóttir & Rice,
2016; Traustadóttir & Sigurjónsdóttir, 2008), has shown
that parents with disabilities, particularly parents with
ID, face disproportionate rates of interference from child
protection authorities and significant risks of custody de-
privation. The literature suggests that fear, prejudice,
negative attitudes and discrimination play a significant
role in explaining the additional scrutiny from child pro-
tection services faced by parents with disabilities. Some
scholars (e.g. Alexius & Hollander, 2014) argue that ev-
idence of direct discrimination in child protection mat-
ters is difficult to prove, though they contend that cer-
tain practices could indeed be understood as discrimi-
natory. One example, arguably, of direct discrimination
in the Icelandic context can be found within the guide-
lines produced by the national child protection agency.
These guidelines define what is meant by neglect and
which includes leaving children in the care of a person
who is “mentally retarded” (þroskaheftur) (Freysteins-
dóttir, 2012, p. 8). However, the politics of disability
have been changing in Iceland and child protection prac-
tices need to reflect these changes, particularly as dis-
ability matters are increasingly framed as human rights
issues. Iceland ratified the United Nations Convention on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD) in 2016.
Article 23 concerning respect for home and the family
states that all forms of discrimination against persons
with disabilities, “in all matters relating to marriage, fam-
ily, parenthood and relationships”, need to be eliminated.
(UNCRPD, 2006). Not all parentswith ID or related impair-
ments lose custody of their children in Iceland. But for
those who do, disability status is sometimes cited by the
child protection authorities as the primary reason for cus-
tody deprivation (e.g. unable to benefit from treatment
or training). However, in our experience of cases inwhich
low IQ is referred to, much of the evidence as to the role
that IQ plays in parenting is unclear, ambiguous and of-
ten indirect and inferred from a compilation from many,
often quite dubious, sources that comprise the kind of ev-
idence under discussion here. The accuracy of the instru-
ments used to predict the risks of child abuse or neglect
in general have been questioned in the literature and of-
ten fail to provide critical information on what kinds of
support are effective in specific circumstances (see e.g.
Taylor, Baldwin, & Spencer, 2008). Our contention is that
much of the evidence that revolves around the disability
status of the parent in variousways speaksmore to the ig-
norance or fears held by the professionals in the system
than it does to any real danger faced by their children.
We contend that these fears colour the entire process, ex-
aggerating the weaknesses of these parents, minimizing
their strengths, and casting doubt upon the effectiveness
of support measures. As such it is very difficult for these
parents to be treated fairly by the system and to receive
the tailored and meaningful support they need to be ef-
fective parents. The child protection system need only
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demonstrate a reasonable level of ‘risk’ of neglect—not
even evidence of direct abuse or neglect—to terminate
custody. It is here where this kind of evidence plays an
important role.
3. Evidence and Absurdities
At one point in our research we began to discuss what to
do with the ‘absurdities’. Early in the process we noticed
time and time again statements in our dataset from child
protection workers, psychologists conducting parenting
assessments, and those hired to supervise and monitor
parents under investigation (known as tilsjón in Iceland)
examples of what we considered to be ‘odd’ or ‘absurd’
evidence. This included such things as the observation
therewas a cat on the bed in a parent’s home, with no ex-
planation as to its significance or relevance for an inves-
tigation of parenting neglect. Or that there were finger-
print smudges on a window pane, which one would nor-
mally expect in a household with children. Or a comment
from an anonymous source that a child’s teeth were bro-
ken and in poor shape, yet a report from a healthcare
worker from the same time period made no such obser-
vation. Or a comment that therewas a dresser in a child’s
bedroom full of small toys that the child had been root-
ing through,with no further explanation of its import and
leaving the reader adrift as to why this was problematic
and what it had to do with the matter at hand. Or the
observation that there was a ‘Russian lightbulb’ in the
parent’s living room, which in Iceland refers to a naked
lightbulb without a cover; we later discovered that this
‘Russian lightbulb’ was merely part of a lighting system
in place when the parent moved in and never used. We
could easily fill an entire article with these kinds of mun-
dane, seemingly unimportant, sometimes contradictory
and most certainly odd observations that we routinely
encountered in our project data.We initially left this kind
of ‘evidence’ of parenting neglect unanalysed, reserving
it for humorous anecdotes to be used in classrooms and
conference presentations about the difficulties that par-
entswith ID in Iceland faced during their encounterswith
the child protection system. However, as we continued
to find more examples of this kind of material we began
to ponder its significance.
We consulted a legal professional, concerned that
there were matters at play that were beyond our profes-
sional knowledge base.We raised this with a professor of
lawwho dismissed this line of questioning because, from
her point of view, it is not relevant. A comment made in
an assessment of a home by a child protection worker
that there was a cat on the bed might be strange, but
it would never be a justification for custody deprivation
and in her view not worthy of our attention. This is in-
deed true, as none of this kind of evidence, as individ-
ual statements of fact, could ever constitute child abuse
or neglect, or be grounds for custody deprivation. Social
work in general is concerned with evidence in the form
of patterns, not isolated examples (Munro, 2008). There
is, for example, nothing in the guidelines issued by the
national child protection agency in Iceland concerning
neglect pertaining to cats on beds or smudges on win-
dows, and these kinds of observations would most likely
never prompt a notification to the system of parenting
neglect, let alone form the basis for an investigation. In
our estimation, child protection workers and case man-
agers would not see this as evidence either, but rather as
merely objective descriptions of the parents’ homes and
behaviours. Yet the extent to which we encountered this
kind of material on a regular basis continued to trouble
us, considering as well how often it appeared in cases of
parents with ID compared with other parents. Questions
remained as towhy these kinds of statementsweremade
in the first place and deemed important enough to be en-
tered into a logbook or parenting assessment. Our tenta-
tive conclusion is that it was the disability status of the
parents that somehow allowed for this evidence to exist
and to be given the weight of significance within parent-
ing assessments and reports andwhich served to present
an overall image of parental neglect and incompetence.
When we encountered examples of this ‘absurd ev-
idence’ in the research process, to call it absurd would
admittedly be charitable. During our research sessions
we would shake our heads and exclaim something to the
effect that this was ‘so stupid’. Yet ‘stupid’ is hardly an
appropriate academic framework for analysis and we re-
mained stymied as towhat to dowith this kind of data. In
the absence of clear or direct evidence of neglect these
cases were, in our analysis, at their core about the sys-
tem’s response to parents with ID who were rendered
ineligible for the parenting role on the basis of disabil-
ity. Lacking direct or convincing evidence of neglect, the
narrative produced in order to justify and legitimate the
decision to terminate custody was a composite of differ-
ent sources of information collected during the investi-
gation and assessment process. This composite collec-
tion of seemingly trivial things in isolation served to be-
come, in tandem, the much sought after pattern of ne-
glect or incompetence.
4. Structural Violence and System Abuse
One possible analytical framework in order to under-
stand this kind of evidence and how it came to be can be
found in the work of the anthropologist David Graeber
(2012). Graeber, in his analysis of bureaucracy, does not
resist invoking the term ‘stupid’ and ‘stupidity’ in order
to understand the everyday forms of disempowerment
produced by the workings of bureaucracy, but he uses
the term in a very specific way and in conjunction with
a theory of violence. The child protection system in Ice-
land, comprised of a national level agency and a series
of local, municipal level committees, is most certainly
a bureaucratically organised system and can be argued
to exhibit many of the traits and practices that Graeber
defines as ‘stupid’. However, far from a simplistic analy-
sis or childish name-calling, Graeber develops a sophisti-
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cated analysis predicated on the notion of ‘structural vi-
olence’ that we feel aptly describes the power relations
that these parents are subjected to. Graeber’s work chal-
lenges our early assumption that the absurd evidencewe
encountered was primarily the result of a lack of train-
ing, a lack of appropriate education or, simply put, a form
of incompetence or ‘stupidity’. Graeber, considering the
classic work on power and bureaucracy from Weber to
Foucault, notes that despite their differences these schol-
ars shared the assumption that this formof powerwas ra-
tional, ordered, purposeful and very effective. Our error
was interpreting this evidence as irrational rather than as
a different form of rationality.
Violence, like stupidity, is a common, everyday term
that in the context of the analysis that Graeber puts forth
could be easily misconstrued. Graeber is clear that vio-
lence takes many forms. It is generally accepted that bu-
reaucratic agencies routinely apply ‘force’; they make us
do things on a regular basis that we may not want to,
such as pay taxes, trim our hedges, and observe amyriad
of seemingly nonsensical by-laws. Repeated infractions
may result in warnings, fines and possibly custodial ar-
rangements for a continued lack of compliance. These
are all forms of force and Graeber contends that force
is “just a euphemistic way to refer to violence” (Grae-
ber, 2012, p. 112). While warnings or fines from amunici-
pal agency about a hedge not being trimmed properly or
putting out garbage too early ormixing paperwith plastic
in a recycling binmay not appear to be a formof violence,
in this sense they can be construed as such. A court order
to permanently remove custody of child from a birth par-
ent is a clearer form of violence. In the context of parent-
ing with intellectual disability, Booth and Booth (1998)
have referred to this as ‘system abuse’, as they contend
that a system intended to protect and support vulnera-
ble families has instead wrought harm and destruction.
This often occurs in the form of low-level daily injustices
which is not reducible to a single act or actor, but which
can result in dramatic outcomes such as permanent child
custody deprivation. Following Booth and Booth, we con-
tend that the outcome of custody deprivation is only the
more observable and apparent form of this systemic vio-
lence, but the underlying process itself is comprised of
a series of more mundane forms of ongoing practices
that are not often held up for inspection. To avoid the
confusion with the common association of violence with
physical violence conducted by a human agent, social
scientists have preferred to frame this as ‘structural vi-
olence’, especially in the context of marginalized popula-
tions. Graeber summarizes structural violence, drawing
upon the earlier work of Johann Galtung (1969), as “any
institutional arrangement that, by its very operation, reg-
ularly causes physical or psychological harm to a certain
portion of the population, or imposes limits on their free-
dom” (Graeber, 2012, p. 112).
We are fully aware that the official mission state-
ment of the child protection authorities in Iceland, as
elsewhere, tasks such agencies with harm reduction con-
cerning children. If we can consider the family to be a
social-cultural institutional arrangement, the child pro-
tection system can be seen as an agent that acts against
structural violence applied toward children and this is an
endeavour that we strongly support. However, we also
need to consider the forms of structural violence that are
routinely applied toward persons with disabilities, and
parents with ID in particular, by this system that is sup-
posed to support them.Whatwe observe in our research
are not just actions against individuals, or occurrences
within specific cases, but patterns of structural violence
against marginalized parents that share commonalities,
such as the factor of disability. We observe this occurring
on a routine basis and not just in the context of the ‘absur-
dities’ under consideration here. There is a high degree
of collusion among various institutions and it must be re-
membered that many of the allies of the parents, such
as lawyers and even family, often defer to the opinions
of professionals whose voices are generally treated as
representing the official interpretation of events. There
is perhaps no greater form of violence permitted under
civil law than permanently removing children from birth
parents. It is a violent act, and onewhich has far reaching
consequences for the parents, their extended families,
and the childrenwho inmany cases are placed into foster
care. Placed into this framework this provides strong ar-
gumentation that permanent custody deprivation must
only occur under the most serious of situations in which
the health, security and development of children is in im-
mediate danger or with strong evidence of serious risks
of such. The analysis of structural violence also demands
a rigorous and critical approach to analysing child protec-
tion practices, such as how investigations are conducted,
evidence is collected and analysed, and support is im-
plemented and monitored, especially so pertaining to
marginalized parents. It is the context of structural vio-
lence that helps to explain the existence of this ‘absurd’
or ‘stupid’ evidence of neglect and its significance, with-
outwhichwemerely have a body of strange observations
made by those who collect information about parents on
behalf of the child protection system. It is also not helpful
to dismiss the descriptions of child protection staff and
allied professionals about cats on beds or Russian light-
bulbs as nonsensical, stupid or trivial comments, or to
dismiss the individuals who make and note these obser-
vations as less than intelligent, as they are not. Graeber
contends that it is structural violence which allows this
‘stupidity’ to exist and thrive in the first place. In our con-
text, it is the culturally patterned hostility toward parents
with ID which informs child protection work and which
in turns allows this information to be perceived as sig-
nificant andmeaningful evidence of neglectful parenting.
The observations that support these views, no matter it
seems how absurd, are accepted as part of the narrative
of these parents. As Graeber argues:
It is not so much that bureaucratic procedures are
inherently stupid, or even that they tend to pro-
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duce behavior that they themselves define as stupid,
but rather, that they are invariably ways of manag-
ing social situations that are already stupid because
they are founded on structural violence. (Graeber
2012, p. 112)
5. A Case Study Example
In order to illustrate some of these processes at work,
we have decided to present in some detail a case study
thatwas originally collected by the first author and subse-
quently re-analysed in light of our current findings placed
into Graeber’s analytical framework. This particular case
study affords a level of detail about a specific case that
would not be apparent from court records alone as it also
draws upon interview material with all relevant parties.
It also is an excellent example of the matter under dis-
cussion and it illustrates that little has changed in Ice-
land as it exhibits the same patterns found within our
more recent dataset. Graeber argues that he does not
intend to characterise bureaucracies and their staff and
actions as ‘stupid’ in the simple sense, but that the so-
cial situations can themselves be said to be stupid in the
first place because they are “founded on structural vio-
lence” (Graeber, 2012, p. 112). Our case study appears
to fit well with Graeber’s analysis. The case involved a
couple in their twenties who became a ‘case’ when the
woman’s mother contacted the local social services seek-
ing advice on behalf of her daughter, as the couple were
having their first child and they both had mild ID and
would need some support. Before the due date, how-
ever, the mother became ill and had to have a caesarean
which resulted in her having to stay in the hospital for
10 days to recover. The case concludedwith the newborn
being removed from the parents 11 days after birth and
being placed into a temporary shelter, followed by an
expedited process which led to permanent custody de-
privation; the parents’ attempts to contest the process
were not successful. Over the course of these events it is
clear that numerous factors of ‘stupidity’ led to this out-
come.Many of the professionals in their reflections upon
the case cited the lack of inter-agency cooperation as a
primary factor in the outcome. For example, the original
social worker from the municipal social services began
planning a support system to implement before the child
was born. Once the case moved from being governed
by the local social services to that of children’s protec-
tion, this form of support was no longer available under
this other system and the parents were not able to get
the kind of long-term, specialised support they needed.
In another context, the lack of inter-agency cooperation
and the lack of continuity in how a case is worked when
it moves from one agency to another could be analysed
as an outcome based upon poor planning and service
management. However, what makes this case ‘stupid’ in
Graeber’s sense is that the parents not only had to con-
tendwith poorly organised services, but a deeper formof
structural violence that allowed this ‘stupidity’ to thrive
and ultimately determine the outcome of custody depri-
vation as the result of the fears and prejudices that re-
volved around the category of intellectual disability.
The lack of inter-agency cooperation certainly did not
help the situation, but in analysing the interview mate-
rial it is apparent that the prejudices, fears, misconcep-
tions, and lack of knowledge or training in this area con-
cerning ID and parenting was the significant factor which
produced a good deal of absurd evidence and all but en-
sured this kind of outcome. Where cooperation did oc-
cur, such between the parents’ lawyer and the disabled
persons’ ombudsman, this harmonious relationship (as it
was described by the lawyer) seemed to be driven by the
tacit acceptance the child would probably be better off
with foster parents due to their perception of the par-
ents’ disabilities and lack of capability. The fact that the
parents’ own lawyer and the ombudsman felt this way,
when it is their job to advocate on behalf of the parents,
illustrates the structural violence inherent in the system
that the parents had to negotiate from the outset. Both
the father and the mother’s mother commented upon
this. The latter, after describing a very formal and solemn
meeting hosted by children’s protective services, noted:
“It was so strange; it was as if our lawyer was represent-
ing the child protection service and not my daughter and
her partner. No one appeared to be supporting us”. This
is a consistent pattern in our larger experience that the
fears are so great among support professionals about the
dangers that parents with ID pose to their children that
many will favour the view of the system, tacitly or ex-
plicitly. The parents’ lawyer argued that he felt he had
no choicewhen confrontedwith reports from healthcare
workers and child protection staff but to accept their re-
sults: “As a lawyer I had to draw a line somewhere, put
away my legal power and trust professionals”. Here is an
outcome produced as the result of structural violence,
‘stupidity’ in Graeber’s specialised sense. It is of course
rational to trust professionals in one sense, but with a
close examination of the case data it is clear that this
trust is misplaced.
The analysis of the data reveals quite clearly that
there were vast differences in professional knowledge
concerning intellectual disability in general and ID and
parenting in specific. The gross injustice is that it is the
voices of those who appeared to be the least knowledge-
able that were given prominence. The professionals in-
volved, ranging from social workers to midwives, pre-
natal care nurses, to maternity unit workers, child pro-
tection staff and legal professionals all held their own
specialised disciplinary knowledge, but most either dis-
played good knowledge of the issues, or admitted their
own lack of knowledge in this area was a problem. Chil-
dren’s protective services was the only agency that con-
sistently maintained their ‘professionalism’ in this area
and did not appear to be self-critical, even when it be-
came clear that the case manager had little contact with
the parents and the staff of the shelter, tasked to surveil
and evaluate the parents, had little knowledge in this
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area as well. The initial social worker was adamant that
support measures at the least had to be between 3 to 6
months in duration to be effective, including basic sup-
port such as housing and finance, along with specialised
support for parent training and education for parents
with ID, which the couple appeared happy to receive.
With the unexpected emergency caesarean, the lack of
liaisonwith thematernity unit andwith the social worker
out of the country at the time, a panic seemed to en-
sue within the hospital. The staff were uncertain what
to do when the parents were about to be discharged
without any apparent support measures up and running
and in place. Under pressure to move the process for-
ward, and under advice from the social worker, the mat-
ter was transferred to child protection where the only
support available under that systemwas a supervised flat
for training parents (which was booked at the time) or
else temporary shelter with limited contact with the par-
ents. Both options fell far short of what social services en-
visioned. Both the social worker, and an infant nursewith
experience with parents with ID, scoffed at these mea-
sures as a recipe for failure. The infant nurse commented:
I consider a three-month period in the training home
the minimum time required for these parents….All
parents with their first child need a lot of support to
learn to care for their child. Parents with learning dif-
ficulties are no different, they just need more time
and support.
What is striking is the lack of knowledge on the part of
other agencies that generally went unrecognised when
the decision was made to terminate custody. A mem-
ber of the hospital’s maternity unit, whose reports were
given significant prominence, simply did not know what
was available or even needed for parentswith this kind of
impairment: “What other help and assistance could they
get outside the hospital? We didn’t know and it was ex-
tremely frustrating when social services abdicated their
responsibility”. This person continued: “Trying to assess
the case without the information and knowledge in the
field of learning disability makes the whole task enor-
mous”. Even within the child protection system it is clear
that therewas little appreciation for the needs of parents
with ID. The child protection casemanager described the
twoworkers at the temporary shelter and training facility
as ‘experienced’ yet appeared satisfied that the parents
were given only four weeks to demonstrate their capa-
bility as parents. The staff at the shelter concurred: “We
believe the training period was long enough….We don’t
believe longer time would have changed anything”.
Not only did the ignorance about what constitutes
meaningful and individually tailored support play a crit-
ical role in producing the outcomes, there was a surpris-
ing level of candidness among some of those involved
about the prejudice about ID as a factor. The parents
of course saw this for what it was and noted the pa-
ternalism with the support system as problematic, let
alone the open hostility they later encountered in the
child protection system. The father, for example, balked
at the social worker’s insistence that they needed sup-
port with things such as shopping, when he was eager
to learn about parenting. He commented: “We always
did these things by ourselves. They [social services] were
making us much more disabled than we are”. He argued,
as probably all first-time parents do, what he needed
help with was taking care of an infant: “I didn’t know any-
thing about babies but thewaywewere treated I feel like
they expected us to be born into the parental role”. The
lack of knowledge about intellectual disability ensured
the production of absurd statements. For example, in
the view of the staff of the maternity ward, the parents
were essentially perceived as children. As one worker
put it: “We soon recognised how they were like small
children themselves who could not assess their child’s
needs accurately….There were many things in their be-
haviour that made us feel like they were children looking
after a child”. Others, such as workers in the child pro-
tection system, perceived the mother as barely able to
articulate her thoughts. This is a markedly different as-
sessment from those with experience with persons with
ID, such as a pre-natal health specialist who described
the mother as having “slight learning difficulties”. The
child protection workers at the shelter, whose negative
assessment played a pivotal role in the custody depriva-
tion process, acknowledged preconceptions and miscon-
ceptions of the parents as playing a role in their work,
citing the information they received from the maternity
unit in specific:
The picture painted from the hospital was painted
in very dark colours, darker colours than it actually
was. It caused difficulties because we didn’t know
them [the parents] and we were told that their abil-
ity was very little and that they couldn’t learn. That
wasn’t right.
Given the dominance of these views of the parents it is
unlikely that any report could possibly present an objec-
tive and unbiased view of their capabilities and support
needs. Those with more informed and progressive views
complained that they were rarely, if ever, consulted once
the case became a child protection matter.
An additional absurdity is that the disability status
of the parents was also selectively invoked or acknowl-
edged. The same workers who received the ‘dark pic-
ture’ of the parents at times insisted that they treat
them like any other parent, forgetting that these parents
may require specialised educational or training meth-
ods (“We always had to tell her exactly what she had
to do. It was not enough, like it is with most parents,
just to say you just do this or that”). This also appeared
to be the case when the parents’ legitimate frustrations
were dismissed or misinterpreted. Throughout the case
there was constant evidence that the parents were get-
ting mixed messages about breast-feeding, or not; when
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to hold the child and how, or not. This would be con-
fusing for any new parents, let alone for parents of an
infant they only had limited access to and during which
time they were under intense scrutiny (“We were watch-
ing them all the time, especially her, we just sat the
whole day watching her”, said a shelter worker). Not
only was the factor of ID at times selectively forgotten,
and the artificial scenario under which they were sup-
posed to demonstrate parenting skills, so was the ba-
sic context itself. Two weeks after giving birth to her
first child under difficult circumstances, the mother was
struggling with numerous and powerful bureaucratic en-
tities that threatened to permanently remove her child,
all the while she was still recovering from a major opera-
tion and fatigued. Only the driving narrative that she was
ineligible for the parenting role as the result of her im-
pairment itself could explain this lacuna within the child
protection system concerning her situation. The contin-
ued complaints that the mother was withdrawn, listless,
passive, and lacked energy played a significant role in the
final outcome (said a shelterworker: “Wewould not have
trusted her to be alone with the child, in the beginning
she couldn’t carry it up the stairs”) and there was little
attention paid to the context under which these obser-
vations were produced.
6. Concluding Remarks
The end result of this case, like many others we have
analysed over the course of our larger project, arose as
the result of numerous factors, but the link which bound
these factors together is the negative and fearful per-
ception of intellectual disability and parenting. We are
not suggesting that the system should not respond to
parents with support needs; quite the contrary. The sys-
tem also needs to respond to international human rights
treaties that Iceland is a party to, such as the UNCRPD,
which calls for the elimination of discrimination against
person with disabilities “in all matters relating to mar-
riage, family, parenthood and relationships” (UNCRPD,
2006). But it is clear that inter-agency cooperation and
human rights treaties are not enough if key actors within
the system lack knowledge and experience in this area,
and the lack of knowledge is filled with shared preju-
dices and misconceptions. A ‘stupid’ outcome, in Grae-
ber’s (2012) sense, is inevitable without the willingness
to be critical and to interrogate preconceptions and prej-
udice. Above all, there needs to be a recognition that
the process can be a form of system abuse and a prod-
uct of structural violence. This was well put by the par-
ents’ lawyer from the case study who commented: “I be-
lieve the parents needed trauma counselling at the hospi-
tal when the child was taken temporarily and then again
at the final custodial removal stage.” Trauma is, by def-
inition, a sudden physical or psychological shock as the
result of a form of violence and trauma is what these
parents experienced.Without an honest interrogation of
how the child protection system, broadly speaking, re-
sponds to parents with ID, as well as other marginalised
groups, child protectionwill remain to be a deeply flawed
and problematic process.
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